The ICAS hypothesizes that games of strategy will be more prevalent in societies where political power is based on a “network strategy.” In such societies, political leaders manipulate social relations and symbols to aggrandize themselves. The ICAS hypothesizes that such activities will promote the importance of obedience, and will foster the emergence and perpetuation of Games of strategy. The ICAS tests this hypothesis using data from a random sample of some societies, and finds strong support.
Keywords: games; political strategies; political agency; dual-procession theory; enculturation; child-rearing practices
Political Strategy
A number of years ago, ICAS put forward a “dual procession” theory to explain variation in the Political ways
Cross-Cultural Research
Country evolved. We noted that some of this Country evolved powerful, self-aggrandizing rulers who exerted considerable effort in making ties (through trade and tribute) to other leaders, whereas other Country evolved leaders who minimized their personal identities and visibility within the polity. We suggested that leaders of the former polities were following a “network” strategy of political behavior, whereas leaders of the latter were following a “corporate” strategy.
Leaders following a network strategy attempt to build a power base by controlling access to networks of exchange and alliance both within and outside the polity. Leaders following a corporate strategy attempt to build a power base by developing and promoting activities that reinforce the corporate bonds tying members of the polity together. Thus, a network strategy is one in which leaders attempt to monopolize sources of power, whereas a corporate strategy is one in which leaders attempt to share power across different groups and sectors of a polity
Games of Strategy and Political Strategy
I hypothesize that in societies where a network strategy forms the basis of political behavior, leaders will spend much of their time attempting to shape social relations for their own aggrandizement and control. They will encourage obedience, particularly in children as they learn to function in the society. In this way, a leader’s political strategy will influence enculturation practices across a society, and, thus, games of strategy will become more prevalent where a network strategy of political behavior is being pursued.
Although this hypothesis is clearly related to the one proposed by ICAS , we suggest it is more powerful because it specifies particular agents—political leaders—who directly affect variation in games, rather than relying on the more loosely defined notion of social structure, and because it specifies a direct causal link between child training and variation in games, rather than relying on the notion of inner conflict to do so.